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LEGAL PROBLEMS IN FLORIDA
MUNICIPAL ZONING,
ERNEST

R.

BARTLEY

Modem American man is terrifyingly dependent upon his fellows.
For the most part he no longer produces even the basic necessities
of his daily existence - the food he eats, the clothes he wears, or the
house he lives in. Our modem man has tended to move into urban
areas, increasing further his dependence upon others to supply his
necessary and luxury demands. With this greatly accelerated migration to the city, the already involved structure of modem society has
become even more incredibly complex. The inevitable result has been
the necessary imposition of a burden of governmental regulation of,
or interference with, persons and property never envisioned by the
founders of this republic.
Government regulation by districts, under the police power, of
height, bulk, and utilization of buildings, the uses to which land may be
put, and the density of population - that is, zoning - is but one dramatic manifestation of the growth of governmental authority resulting
from increased urbanization. The requirement that owners of property conform to the broad plans for a community's development has
meant, in many cases, the subordination of personal interests to what
has been deemed to be the public interest.
Few states have had to face in such large measure the problem of
urban growth, with all its attendant difficulties, as has the State of
Florida. One hundred sixty-seven areas in the United States are classed
by the United States Bureau of the Census as "metropolitan." Miami,
Orlando, Tampa-St. Petersburg, and Jacksonville rank fourth, tenth,
twenty-first, and thirty-first respectively in percentage of growth among
those 167 metropolitan areas for the period 1940 to 1950. Metropolitan Miami had a phenomenal 84.9 per cent growth rate during that
ten-year span. 2 Only the State of California has so many metropolitan
areas ranking as high in percentage rate of growth as Florida.
*The writer records his debt to Mr. William W. Boyer, Jr., with whom he is
co-author of MUNICIPAL ZONING: FLORIDA LAw AND PRACTICE. This 100-page monograph, published in 1950 by the University of Florida Public Administration Clearing
Service, formed a point of departure for this article.
lBAssLrr, ZONING 45 (1940); 8 MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §25.01
(3d ed., Smith, 1950).
2
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1952, 16, 17. The State of Florida

[355]
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UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

Florida municipalities have seen the capacities of utility systems
outstripped by a mass influx of population never contemplated in the
halcyon days of the great boom. In the last few years practically every
Florida city has been forced to expend considerable sums of money in
expanding sewage, water, light, and transportation facilities. The
increase in population has forced some municipalities to take on added
functions not traditionally classified as governmental in character.
Municipal business is big business in the Sunshine State.
Florida cities today realize the necessity of presenting a clean and
orderly appearance to the tourist and the new resident. Tourism,
the state's most important "industry," is hurt by dirty and ill-planned
cities. Parks, recreation facilities, neat residential areas, correctly
placed industrial activities - these and many other facets of a wellconceived and well-executed city plan are fundamental to the continued growth and progress of Florida.
This article is not concerned with the broad topic of "city planning."3 Rather this discussion is devoted to a consideration of some
of the legal problems arising from comprehensive municipal zoning
in Florida. Contrary to impressions still held in many quarters,
"zoning" and "planning" are not interchangeable words and do not
cover identical fields of municipal endeavor. Zoning is the tool by
which many of the objectives of city planning may be implemented,
the machinery by which a part of the city plan may be carried out.
The technique of zoning is one which is a twentieth-century development. Comprehensive zoning -that is, an over-all city zoning
plan - had its genesis in the City of New York in 1916, when the first
comprehensive zoning ordinance in the United States was passed.
This ordinance, drawn after a number of years of study and research,
established a zoning pattern for the entire nation. By 1921 approximately 100 American cities had adopted fairly complete zoning schemes.
It is true that restrictions which were the forerunners of presentday zoning existed prior to 1916. Through the utilization of what
Dean Jefferson B. Fordham has called the "nuisance technique"'
many undesirable activities were restricted to particular areas of a
city.5 In addition to regulations based on the nuisance technique,
grew 46.1% in this period, a rate surpassed only by California, Arizona, and
Nevada.

3Today this term is generally conceded to embrace the entire group of complex
urban problems -physical, social, economic, and governmental.
4LocAL GOVERNMENT LAw 836 (1949).
5Livery stables were barred, for obvious reasons, from particular areas ot
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restrictions on the use of property were passed which were based on
one or more of the ideas of sanitation and health, 6 police and fire
protection,7 or the protection of public safety through the regulation
of building and construction practices.8 None of these types of
restrictions were or are, properly speaking, comprehensive zoning.
The legality of comprehensive municipal zoning is today firmly
established; dispute as to its general validity is past history. 9 Yet
many problems dealing with statutory interpretation and application
of zoning ordinances remain. It is with some of these problems, as
they have arisen in Florida, that this article is concerned. The discussion will be confined in the main to municipal zoning, but recognition should be taken of the fact that county zoning is of great
importance in certain sections of Florida and that the legal problems
of county zoning for the most part are not basically dissimilar to
those encountered by municipalities.
Under the American federal system, the power to control local
government is reserved to the states. Cities are creatures of the states;
and, subject to the limitations imposed by the federal and state constitutions, a state legislature holds plenary power over the municipal
corporations which it creates. Powers are granted to or withheld
from municipal corporations at the option of the legislature. The
many 19th and early 20th century cities. Reinman v. Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171 (1915);
St. Louis v. Russell, 116 Mo. 248, 22 S.W. 470 (1893). One of the earlier ordinances
of this general type in Florida restricted the erection of billboards. Anderson v.
Shackleford, 74 Fla. 36, 76 So. 343 (1917).
6The United States Supreme Court in the famous case of Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915), held valid, as a proper exercise of the state's police
power to protect public health, an ordinance prohibiting the operation of brickyards in certain portions of Los Angeles.
7This ground was used to sustain regulation of laundries operated by Orientals
in West Coast cities. Ex parte Quong Wo, 161 Cal. 220, 118 Pac. 714 (1911); In re
Hang Kie, 69 Cal. 149, 10 Pac. 327 (1886). A San Francisco ordinance restricting
the hours during which laundries might be operated was sustained as a fire protection measure in Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27 (1885).
8A recent case, but one illustrative of reliance on this rationale, is Queenside
Hills Realty Co. v. Saxl, 328 U.S. 80 (1946).
DThe basic case establishing the constitutionality of comprehensive zoning is
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). State supreme courts,
in notable decisions prior to the Euclid case, had set the stage for the national high
tribunal's opinion: Miller v. Board of Public 'Works, 195 Cal. 477, 234 Pac. 381
(1925); Aurora v. Bums, 319 Ill. 84, 149 N.E. 784 (1925); State ex rel. Civello v.
New Orleans, 154 La. 271, 97 So. 440 (1923).
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UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

Supreme Court of the United States has stated the principle in this
fashion:10
"In the absence of state constitutional provisions safeguarding it to them, municipalities have no inherent right of
a self-government which is beyond the legislative control of
the state. A municipality is merely a department of the state,
and the state may withhold, grant or withdraw powers and
privileges as it sees fit. However great or small its sphere of
action, it remains the creature of the state exercising and holding powers and privileges subject to the sovereign will."
The state, which holds the police power, grants a portion of that
power to the city in order better to safeguard public health, morals,
safety, public order, and welfare. Accordingly, cities are not inherently empowered to zone. The power of a Florida city to adopt
and enforce a zoning ordinance, it may be stated categorically, exists
only by virtue of delegation from the State of Florida. Article VIII,
Section 8, of the Constitution empowers the legislature to establish
and abolish municipalities and to prescribe municipal jurisdiction and
powers. In Florida, prior to 1939, delegation to municipalities of the
power to zone was accomplished through many special legislative
acts. 1 In that year, however, the Florida Legislature adopted a genlOTrenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182, 187 (1923). Similar statements are
found in Hunter v. Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161 (1907); Atkin v. Kansas, 191 U.S.
207 (1903); Laramie County v. Albany County, 92 U.S. 307 (1875).
In People v. Hurlbut, 24 Mich. 44 (1871), Judge Cooley enunciated the doctrine
of an inherent right of local self-government. The doctrine has had a limited
currency, e.g., Montana ex rel. Kern v. Arnold, 100 Mont. 346, 49 P.2d 976 (1935).
Authorities generally, however, do not recognize an inherent right to local selfgovernment.
The Florida Supreme Court has spoken of "powers inherent in municipal
corporations." In holding valid a St. Petersburg ordinance regulating the sale
of liquor the Court stated that "a municipality exercising the powers inherent
in municipal corporations may reasonably regulate the sale of intoxicating liquors
. . . and also may prohibit the sale of liquors within certain zones." State ex rel.
Floyd v. Noel, 124 Fla. 852, 854, 169 So. 549, 550 (1936). Florida practice has not,
however, been aligned with this dictum. Fleeman v. Vocelle, 160 Fla. 898, 37 So.2d
164 (1948), held that a municipality has only such powers respecting regulation and
control of alcoholic beverages as are granted by the legislature.
11So far as Florida counties are concerned, there are approximately 30 special
acts. There are in addition seven general acts empowering counties to zone. These
acts are based on population classifications long since out of date, Bair, Planning
Newsletter 2, Dec. 1952 (published by Fla. State Imp. Comm'n).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1953

5

Florida Law Review, Vol. 6, Iss. 3 [1953], Art. 4
MUNICIPAL ZONING
eral zoning enabling act' 2 patterned after the standard state enabling
act drafted in 1926 by an advisory committee appointed by Secretary
of Commerce Herbert Hoover. This 1939 act constitutes the most
important piece of zoning legislation on the Florida statute books
today.
THE PRESUMPTIVE VALIDITY OF ZONING ORDINANCES

Restrictions by Florida municipalities on the use of land were not
uncommon prior to the decision of the United States Supreme Court
in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.13 These restrictions utilized
the nuisance technique or were based on the idea of protecting health
or safety. The Florida Supreme Court during the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries interpreted strictly the legislative grants
of power to municipalities to enact the ordinances.
More frequently than not these ordinances were declared invalid
under the generally accepted doctrine of the strict construction of
municipal powers. 14 The Florida high tribunal, in passing on city
enactments regulating the use of land, frequently used the phrase,
"If reasonable doubt exists as to a particular power of a municipality,
it should be resolved against the city," or words to that effect. 15 There
was no presumption of validity8 favoring the ordinance during these
l2Fla. Laws 1939, c. 19539, now FLA. STAT. §176 (1951). Florida was the last
state to pass such general enabling legislation. FLA. STAT. §167.71 (1951) authorizes
municipal corporations to zone when necessary to cooperate with the Federal
Housing Administration.
"3272 U.S. 365 (1926); see note 9 supra.
'4The rule applicable to construction of municipal powers generally is well
stated by Dillon in MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §237 (1881): "It is a general and undisputed proposition of law that a municipal corporation possesses and can exercise the following powers and no others: First, those granted in express words;
second, those necessarily or fairly implied in or incident to the powers expressly
granted; third, those essential to the accomplishment of the declared objects and
purposes of the corporation,- not simply convenient, but indispensable. Any fair,
reasonable, substantial doubt concerning the existence of power is resolved by the
courts against the corporation, and the power is denied."
"See, e.g., Wyeth v. Whitman, 72 Fla. 40, 41, 72 So. 472, 473 (1916); Malone
v. City of Quincy, 66 Fla. 52, 56, 62 So. 922, 924 (1913); Ellis v. Tampa Waterworks Co., 56 Fla. 858, 864, 47 So. 358, 360 (1908); cf. Pensacola v. Fillingim, 46
So.2d 876 (Fla. 1950); St. Petersburg v. Florida Coastal Theatres, 43 So.2d 525 (Fla.
1949).
16Mr. Chief Justice Hughes has stated the modem doctrine of presumption
in this manner: "When the classification made by the legislature is called in
question, if any state of facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain it,
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early years. One who attacked the ordinance did not have to prove
beyond reasonable doubt that the enactment was invalid. Rather
the burden was on the city to demonstrate express municipal authority
to enact the measure.
This attitude of the judiciary toward ordinances restricting land
use alleged to be enacted ultra vires is typically demonstrated in State
1
ex rel. Shad v. Fowler.The charter of the City of Jacksonville expressly provided that the municipality should have the following
powers: s
".... 'To make regulations to secure the general health of the
inhabitants and to prevent and remove nuisances,' 'To provide for the cleaning and keeping in good sanitary condition
any and all premises within the limits of the city.' 'To pass
all ordinances necessary for the health, convenience and safety
of the citizens.'
Pursuant to these provisions the city adopted an ordinance providing,
in part,
"... no permit shall be issued.., for any building to be erected
within the territory described ... which is to be used for any
there is a presumption of the existence of that state of facts, and one who assails
the classification must carry the burden of showing by a resort to common knowledge or other matters which may be judicially noticed, or to other legitimate
proof, that the action is arbitrary." Borden Farm Products Co. v. Baldwin, 293
U.S. 194, 209 (1934).
The doctrine is based upon three pertinent and interrelated principles: (1)
that judicial inquiry is not concerned with the accuracy of a legislative finding
but only with the question of whether the legislative action so lacks reasonable
basis as to be arbitrary, Bordens Farm Products Co. v. Ten Eyck, 297 U.S. 251, 263
(1936); (2) that the adoption of one standard rather than another is a legislative
rather than a judicial choice and constitutionality is not to be determined by
having the judiciary weigh the merits of the legislative effort and reject it if the
weight of evidence presented in court appears to favor a different standard, South
Carolina Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Brothers, 303 U.S. 177, 191 (1938); (3) that
it is not the function of the judiciary to substitute its judgment for that of the
legislature, else the legislature becomes a forum for the formulation of hypothetical
propositions which can become imperative only in case courts conclude that the
facts on which their applicability depend actually exist, Bordens Farm Products
Co. v. Ten Eyck, 11 F. Supp. 599, 600 (S.D.N.Y. 1935).
1790 Fla. 155, 105 So. 733 (1925).
iSld. at 158, 105 So. at 734. In Metropolis Pub. Co. v. Miami, 100 Fla. 784, 129
So. 913 (1930), a zoning ordinance was held inapplicable because no legislative
authority empowering the city commission to zone the city was shown.
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purpose other than that of a residence ....[I] t shall be unlawful for any person or persons, firm or corporation to establish
or engage in any grocery, meat, fruit or other line of mercantile business of whatsoever kind or nature, within the boundaries of the territory designated."
The owner of a lot within the restricted area sought a writ of mandamus to compel the building commissioner to issue to him a permit
to construct a two-story building, the first floor to be used for a
grocery store and the second for a residential apartment. Upon answer
by the city the alternative writ was quashed and dismissed. On writ
of error the owner claimed, inter alia, that the charter did not authorize adoption of the ordinance.
The Supreme Court declared the ordinance invalid, reasoning
that there was nothing in the law or within the general scope of
knowledge that made such a building a nuisance, and stating that the
courts will not enforce doubtful municipal powers. The Court thus
based its decision upon the concept that there was nothing within the
law or the general scope of knowledge that made such a building, per
se, a nuisance. The Court, in substance, said that the city has the
burden of proving the authority to enact the ordinance, that there
is no presumption of validity favoring the ordinance, and that any
doubt should be resolved against the city.
Within a year after the Fowler case the epoch-making Euclid
decision made available a legal tool for the regulation of land by
municipalities. In the years following the Euclid case several Florida
cities, among them Fort Lauderdale in 1926, Palm Beach in 1929, and
Miami Beach in 1930, not only adopted comprehensive zoning ordinances but, in the absence of any general Florida enabling act, patterned these ordinances after the United States Department of Commerce standard state enabling act for municipal zoning mentioned
above. The ordinances adopted by these Florida cities were, of course,
passed pursuant to special legislative grants of power in each case.
In recent years the Florida Court has shifted away from its earlier
position placing the burden upon the municipality to prove the
validity of its ordinances to the doctrine that a presumption of constitutionality attaches to municipal ordinances enacted under the
power delegated by the state legislature. The corollary of this doctrine, that the burden of proof rests upon the challenger of a zoning
ordinance, has also been maintained by the Court.
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Referring to the burden of proof required by the presumption
doctrine, Mr. Chief Justice Buford noted in State ex rel. Skillman v.
Miami:19
".... the validity of ordinances dividing the city into districts
and limiting the use of real estate within such districts to
certain purposes has been sustained, it being held that in order
for such ordinance to be declared unconstitutional it must
affirmatively appear that the restriction is clearly arbitrary and
unreasonable and has not any substantial relation to the public
safety, health, morals, comfort or general welfare."
The basic importance of the presumption doctrine can best be
emphasized by observing what may happen when the city fails to
invoke the presumption in defense of its zoning ordinance against
private attack. Thus it does not appear, from a careful analysis of
the facts, that the city relied upon the doctrine of presumptive validity
in Miami Beach v. Ocean and Inland Co. 20 The two parties appeared
again as litigants later in the same year. The two cases are separate
and distinct, but the facts are essentially the same. In the second
case 21 the company filed suit to enjoin the city from enforcing a
zoning provision affecting two company-owned lots that restricted
the use of the area to hotels and apartment hotels. The company
charged that the character of the surrounding property had so changed
since the establishment of the initial zoning classification that no
longer could there be found "a substantial relationship to public
safety, welfare, morals, or health in the continuance of the zoning
22
restrictions now in force.."
In the first case the Supreme Court's decision was against the city.
In the second the city, appealing from a decree granting the relief
prayed for, apparently changed its grounds from those given in the
first case. Emphasis was placed on the presumption of constitutionality
that attaches to zoning ordinances. In finding for the city in the
19101 Fla. 585, 594, 134 So. 541, 545 (1931). In State ex rel. Office Realty Co.
v. Ehinger, 46 So.2d 601 (Fla. 1950), the Court held that a regularly enacted municipal ordinance will be presumed valid until the contrary is shown; the party
seeking to overthrow the ordinance has the burden of proof of establishing the
invalidity of the ordinance.
20146 Fla. 145, 200 So. 402 (1941).
21147 Fla. 480, 3 So.2d 364 (1941).
221d. at 483, 3 So.2d at 365.
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second case, Mr. Justice Thomas, speaking for the Court, observed:23
"We do not find in the ordinance[,] meanwhile conscious of
the presumption of the correct exercise of the discretion of the
city council to deal with zoning within their jurisdiction, the
earmarks of arbitrariness and unreasonableness which would
justify judicial interference."
The assailant of a zoning ordinance must prove more than the
fact that depreciation in the value of his property will result from
the enforcement of the ordinance. Clear proof must be presented
that the zoning restrictions bear no valid relationship to the police
power before the courts can accord his contention favorable consideration.
Possibly the most important recent case in this regard is Standard
Oil Co. v. Tallahassee.24 The oil company, owner and operator
of a filling station across the street from the state capitol, brought
an action to enjoin enforcement of a Tallahassee zoning ordinance
that would compel the service station to discontinue permanently its
operations. The ordinance was held valid and enforceable by the
5
United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida.
In the oil company's appeal to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit the city first argued the principle of the presumption of validity surrounding such ordinances. To rebut this
presumption the company argued that it had spent considerable sums
of money in the construction, operation, and maintenance of the
service station. It further contended that the enforcement of the
ordinance would greatly depreciate the value of its property and
would be tantamount to depriving it of its property without due process of law. The city did not dispute the charge that enforcement
would result in depreciation of the value of the company's property
but contended that the ordinance was a reasonable exercise of the
municipality's power to zone and that "every presumption is in favor
of the validity of the ordinance." 2
The Court of Appeals agreed with this point of view. Pointing
231d. at 487, 3 So.2d at 367; accord, Glackman v. Miami Beach, 51 So.2d 294
(Fla. 1951); Miami v. Rosen, 151 Fla. 677, 10 So.2d 307 (1942); State ex rel. Dallas
Inv. Co. v. Peace, 139 Fla. 394, 190 So. 607 (1939).
24183 F.2d 410 (5th Cir. 1950).
2587 F. Supp. 145 (N.D. Fla. 1949).
2oBrief of Appellee, p. 82.
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UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

out that a presumption of validity attaches to zoning ordinances,
Judge McCord observed that the Florida Supreme Court had repeatedly sustained legislation conferring the power to zone on Florida
cities and that in such cases the courts were not permitted to substitute their judgment for that of the city council. Since the service
station was near the state capitol as well as several other state office
buildings, its discontinuance under the ordinance could not be viewed
as having no relation to the general welfare. "[C]onsiderations of
financial loss or of so-called 'vested rights' in private property are insufficient to outweigh the necessity for legitimate exercise of the police
power of a municipality."27
The presumption of validity is, of course, rebuttable. The challenger of an ordinance has an opportunity guaranteed by the Florida
general enabling act to introduce evidence in an effort to override
the presumption of constitutionality.28 The court in which the zoning
27183 F.2d 410, 413 (5th Cir. 1950). In Texas Co. v. Tampa, 100 F.2d 347, 348
(5th Cir. 1938), the court said, in discussing the police power relative to zoning
regulation of filling stations: "The general rule appears to be that, while the courts
have refused to define within precise bounds the limits of the police power of a
state, their disposition and trend seems to be in favor of holding valid the laws
relating to matters completely within the territory of the state enacting them.
The courts reluctantly disagree with the local legislative authorities, who are
primarily judges of the public welfare."
In State ex rel. Dallas Inv. Co. v. Peace, 139 Fla. 394, 395, 190 So. 607, 608
(1939), the Court said: "Standards of business, social and professional conduct have
their variations peculiar to every community. These standards such ordinances
as that brought in question are designed to regulate and the manner of thcir
regulation is distinctly a legislative function. If the ordinance is enacted in the
interest of the public and is designed to correct an evil or evils that are or may
affect the public welfare, it should be upheld. The manner in which these purposes are accomplished is one in which legislative discretion has a very broad
range and courts should not attempt to substitute their judgment for that of
the legislature, City Commission or other legislative body created for that purpose."
It may be of interest to note that in Standard Oil Co. v. Tallahassee, 183 F.2d
410, 414 (5th Cir. 1950), Chief Judge Hutcheson dissented, saying: "I am in no
doubt that in sustaining this admittedly confiscatory ordinance, a good general
principle, the public interest in zoning, has been run into the ground, the tail of
legislative confiscation by caprice has been permitted to wag the dog of judicial
constitutional protection."
2sFLA. STAT. §176.19 (1951) provides: "If, upon the hearing, it shall appear to
the court that the testimony is necessary for the proper disposition of the matter,
it may take evidence or appoint a referee to take such evidence as it may direct
and report the same to the court with his findings of fact and conclusions of law,
which shall constitute a part of the proceedings upon which the determination
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ordinance is questioned may take evidence or appoint a referee to do
so. The challenger of an ordinance might, for example, introduce
evidence supporting a charge, of discrimination or tending to show
that enforcement of the zoning ordinance would depreciate the value
of his property to such an extent that the action would constitute
outright confiscation. In weighing this evidence the court is not
precluded from upholding such charges even though the presumption
has been invoked in defense of the zoning ordinance. The court
would simply be declaring that the challenger of the ordinance had
met the burden required to rebut the presumption.
This was the situation in the recent case of Miami Beach v. First
Trust C0.29 The First Trust Co., trustee of the Firestone Estate in

Miami Beach, had filed a bill of complaint attacking a Miami Beach
zoning ordinance. The company prayed that the city be enjoined from
interfering with the rental of rooms and apartments in buildings located on the Firestone property or the construction of hotels and
apartment houses thereon. It charged that enforcement of the ordinance would be "unreasonable, arbitrary, confiscatory, and invalid."
A master was appointed by the chancellor to hear testimony. Over
the master's recommendation that the bill of complaint be dismissed
with prejudice, the chancellor held the ordinance invalid and unenforceable.
On appeal to the Florida Supreme Court the city contended that
the ordinance was presumptively valid, that if it was fairly debatable it
should be upheld, and that the court should not substitute its judgment for that of the city council of Miami Beach. The Court, in a
five to two decision, upheld the ordinance, reversed the decree, and
remanded the matter to the chancellor for review.
Upon petition for rehearing by the company the Supreme Court
agreed to review the case again. Mr. Justice Terrell wrote the majority opinion, the Court splitting four to three on this occasion. He
admitted that he had been one of the judges subscribing to the first
opinion based on the presumption doctrine. Said the justice: 30
"....

I am convinced that our judgment was erroneous. When,

of the court shall be made. The court may reverse or affirm, wholly ot partly,
or may modify the decision brought up for review."
2945 So.2d 681 (Fla. 1950). The opinion of the Court and the dissent in the
first case are combined with the opinion of the Court on rehearing. The case was
heard in the first instance in 1949 and on rehearing in 1950.
3045 So.2d 681, 688 (Fla. 1950).
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as here, the constitutional rights of the citizen are assaulted,
I do not think the Court can in the manner shown bypass its
duty to adjudicate them. Most assuredly is this true when the
assault is shown to have merit."
It is pertinent to inquire why the Court reversed its previous decision. Two of the judges actually shifted their positions. Careful
analysis shows that a majority in the first case refused to take judicial
notice of certain facts supporting the company's attack. These crucial
31
facts were stated by Mr. Justice Terrell as follows:

"Both the Master and the Chancellor found that the zoning
restrictions had reduced the value of the land of complainants
by three-fourths, that as zoned for the uses indicated by the
ordinance, they were worth $400,000 but if permitted to be used
for apartment houses and hotels, as were the lands adjoining
them, they had a value of $1,750,000."
Not a single property owner in the city, moreover, was shown to be
hurt by the removal of the zoning restrictions as applied to the Firestone Estate. If they were not removed, on the other hand, they
would cost the company, as trustee, more than one million dollars.
"Under such circumstances," said Mr. Justice Terrell, "they amount to
32

confiscation.."

Three judges remained unconvinced that the presumption had
been rebutted by the evidence. Thus it may be said that, although
depreciation of property values is not enough to rebut the presumption, as was demonstrated in the Standard Oil case, 33 still it is possible
to convince the courts that depreciation can be so great as to constitute confiscation of property without due process of law. Certainly
the Firestone Estate case illustrates how difficult it is in attacking the
constitutionality of zoning ordinances to rebut the presumption of
constitutionality.
In a previous case, Snedigar v. Keefer,34 the Court appears to have
31Ibid. Mr. Justice Thomas, dissenting in Siegel v. Adams, 44 So.2d 427, 429
(Fla. 1950), expresses an opposite point of view: "I do not subscribe to the thinking
that eventual monetary gain to complaining property holders is a determing factor
in a controversy involving the propriety of zoning restrictions because, patently,
in many like situations the individual might prosper by breaking down restrictions, while the community as a whole might suffer."
3245 So.2d 681, 688 (1950).
33183 F.2d 410 (5th Cir. 1950).
34181 Fla. 191, 179 So. 421 (1938).
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regarded decrease in the value of property under the zoning ordinance
as evidence of unreasonable classification. The Court upheld the
master's finding that the value of the property concerned had "'decreased to such an extent as verges on confiscation provided its utilization for legitimate business purposes is further denied.'-35 From
the given facts of the case it appears that the value of the property
steadily declined after an amendment to the zoning ordinance. It
is significant to note the master's finding that under the doctrine of
equitable estoppel the city was estopped from interfering with the
use of the property for the desired purposes.
In the Snedigar case the Court was of course faced with a choice
between two presumptions: (1) in favor of municipal legislation and
(2) in favor of the lower court's decision affirming the master's findings.
It chose the latter. The statement can be made, moreover, that
seldom has the Supreme Court of Florida reversed a lower court's
decision which affirmed the master's findings in a zoning case.36
MUNICIPAL ZONING PROCEDURE

Prior to the adoption of the Florida enabling act in 1939, the
statutory prescription of procedures to be followed by the municipality
in adopting and implementing zoning ordinances was accomplished
either through a special act of the legislature or through the charter
351d. at 194, 179 So. at 422. In Forde v. Miami Beach, 146 Fla. 676, 681, 1 So.2d
642, 645 (1941), the Court said: "The object of all use zoning, in a measure at
least attainable, should be to put the land to the uses to which it is best adapted,
and the result will normally be to increase values." Again in Ehinger v. State,
147 Fla. 129, 2 So.2d 357 (1941), one of the material factors which induced the
Court to hold that the owner was being deprived of the constitutional enjoyment
of his property, and to strike down a single family zoning restriction, was the
fact that property had a value of $10,000 to $30,000 for single family use and of
the $75,000 to ;100,000 for apartment house use.
3The Snedigar case is illustrative of another limitation on the doctrine of
presumptive validity. If the challenger of a zoning ordinance can introduce evidence sufficient to invoke the doctrine of equitable estoppel and thus rebut the
doctrine of presumed validity before the master and the chancellor, the Florida
Supreme Court may hold the presumption to be refuted. The doctrine of
equitable estoppel has failed, however, to rebut the presumption in more instances
than it has succeeded. Examples of Florida cases in which the doctrine of equitable
estoppel has failed to rebut the presumption are Miami Shores Village v. Win.
N. Brockway Post 124, 156 Fla. 673, 24 So.2d 33 (1945), and Godson v. Surfside,
150 Fla. 614, 8 So.2d 497 (1942). But cf. Frink v. Orleans Corp., 159 Fla. 646, 32
So.2d 425 (1947).
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incorporating the municipality. Since the passage of the 1939 act,
which is applicable to all cities electing to adopt comprehensive zoning
plans, 37 zoning of Florida cities must be accomplished in the manner
prescribed by the act and "in accordance with the charter of such
municipality."
Even though the 1939 act sets out procedures in the most general
terms, strict compliance with statutory requirements must be had or
the ordinance will be voidable. So long as the requirements of the
statute are met, however, the establishment of the details of zoning
procedure is left to the municipalities.
The zoning regulations must be made "in accordance with a
comprehensive plan" designed, "with reasonable consideration," to
take into account the character of the district and its peculiar suitability for particular uses. The plan must be constructed "with view
to conserving the value of buildings and encouraging the most appropriate use of land throughout said municipalities." Thus the
zoning plan is not only negative in the restrictive sense of its application but positive in terms of an over-all plan for the future development of the community. The zoning statute contemplates careful, serious, and intelligent preparation of zoning ordinances and
many amendments enacted pursuant to them. 38
3

7FLA. STAT.

§176 (1951).

3SThe statutory requirement that ordinances must be drafted in accord with
a comprehensive plan has been ignored, on occasion, by some Florida cities. Bair,
Planning Newsletter 1, Sept. 1952, states, "Comprehensive plans are a rarity in
Florida .... "
Courts of other states with general enabling acts almost identical to that of
Florida have found particular ordinances invalid because they were not made in
conformity with a "comprehensive plan." In Chapman v. Troy, 241 Ala. 637, 4 So.2d
1 (1941), the court held invalid an ordinance which designated a small portion
of the city as a residential district, took no account of other areas equally residential in character, and was apparently without any comprehensive plan for
the general welfare of the city as a whole. Accord, Appley v. Township Committee,
128 N.J.L. 195, 24 A.2d 805 (Sup. Ct.), afj'd, 129 N.J.L. 73, 28 A.2d 177 (1942).
In Florida the rule apparently has not been held completely binding. In Ellis
v. Winter Haven, 60 So.2d 620 (Fla. 1952), the Court held that the state-wide
zoning law is a grant of power only and does not require that the cities to which
it applies establish a comprehensive zoning system. The ruling certainly does
not accord with those of the jurisdictions cited above. The Ellis case may not be
the last word on this question. The facts there at issue were not clearly drawn
on the "comprehensive plan" issue alone. From the standpoint of practical necessity, if the statement by Bair be taken as correct, the Florida Supreme Court
could not afford to strike down ordinances on the comprehensive plan requirement
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The Zoning Commission
It is customary in zoning to provide certain guarantees of citizen
participation, and the Florida enabling act is no exception. A municipality seeking to enact a zoning ordinance must establish a zoning commission, which body has the functions of investigating, making recommendations as to the various districts, and suggesting appropriate
regulations. According to the statute, 30
"Such commission shall make a preliminary report and hold
public hearings thereon before submitting its final report, and
the governing body of the said municipality shall not hold its
public hearings or take action until it has received the final
report of such commission."
The zoning commission, an advisory body, thus becomes an instrument of preliminary adjustment, for it must be appointed if the
municipality is to avail itself of the power conferred by the enabling
act. Property owners can make their desires known before any final
action on the zoning regulations is taken by the city council. The
resulting ordinance is more likely to represent a concensus of community opinion than if the city council acted without preliminary
study. Omission of the zoning commission, or failure of the city council
to wait for the final report of the commission before taking action,
40
would constitute grounds for invalidation of the resulting ordinance.
Notice and Hearing
In Florida, according to the general act, no zoning regulation may
become effective until parties in interest and citizens have an opportunity to be heard at a public hearing. Notice must be given at
least fifteen days prior to the hearing. The time and place must
be published in a city newspaper of general circulation, or, if no newspaper is available, by notices posted in at least three conspicuous
places within the municipality.4
without running the risk of creating legal chaos in the state's zoning pattern.
39FLA. STAT. §176.07 (1951).
4oThere are no Florida cases in point. The weight of authority in other jurisdictions is as stated. Burlington v. Dunn, 318 Mass. 216, 61 N.E.2d 243 (1945),
cert. denied, 326 U.S. 739 (1945); State ex rel. Westminster Presbyterian Church
v. Edgecomb, 108 Neb. 859, 189 N.W. 617 (19R2); BAssmr, ZONING 36, 37 (1940).
4IFLA. STAT. §176.05 (1951). In Hollywood v. Rix, 52 So.2d 135 (Fla. 1951).
the Court held that the city was not authorized by statute to enact a zoning
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These provisions in the 1939 act were not new to Florida cities.
City charters prior to that date, as well as special acts empowering
particular cities to zone, generally had provisions requiring notice
and hearing. Further, prior to 1939 the cities themselves in passing
zoning ordinances usually conformed to the provisions of the standard
act suggested by the Department of Commerce, among which were
those for notice and hearing.
Florida cities must conform strictly to the requirements for notice
and hearing set out in the 1939 enabling act or in the city charters
or in special legislation granting power to zone. 42 The provisions of
the general enabling act are, by inference, a part of every municipal
charter, although the act does not modify special legislation. The
provisions of the act relative to notice and hearing apply not only
to the establishment of a comprehensive zoning ordinance but also
to all amendments or changes in the zoning regulations. Allowance
is made for the customary "twenty percent protest" 43 found in most
ordinance without the notice and hearing required by the general enabling act.
Although the Court did not discuss the point, there is the gravest doubt as to the
constitutionality of any special act granting to a city the power to pass a zoning
act without notice and hearing.
42
1n State ex rel. Stephens v. Jacksonville, 103 Fla. 177, 187 So. 149 (1931),
the Court held invalid a zoning ordinance on the ground, inter alia, that the
record showed that the charter requirement of notice had not been met.
Extra-jurisdictional authority is solidly behind the doctrine of strict conformance to requirements on notice and hearing. See, e.g., Estabrook v. Chamberlain,
240 App. Div. 899, 267 N.Y. Supp. 425 (2d Dep't 1933); Friedlander v. 465 Lexington Ave., Inc., 222 App. Div. 689, 224 N.Y. Supp. 800 (2d Dep't 1927).
In Ellis v. Winter Haven, 60 So.2d 620 (Fla. 1952), the city had adopted an
ordinance prohibiting the on-the-premises sale of nonintoxicating beer in a
small area within the city limits. The city did not follow the procedure prescribed by c. 20202, Fla. Spec. Acts 1939, a special zoning law applicable only to
Winter Haven. In 1935 the State Beverage Act had granted power to cities to
zone liquor establishments. The Court held that the Legislature did not intend
to repeal this general power by c. 20202 in so far as it applied to liquor zoning;
hence the city had the power under the State Beverage Act to enact the ordinance
and was not required to follow the procedure of the special zoning law. Although
the case turned on statutory interpretation, it is interesting to note the careful
examination given the procedural question by the Court- even in the exceptional
field of liquor control.
43FLA. STAT. §176.06 (1951) says in this regard: "In case, however, of protest
against such change signed by the owners of twenty per cent or more either of the
area of the lots included in such proposed change, or of those immediately adjacent
in the rear thereof extending five hundred feet therefrom, or of those directly
opposite thereto extending five hundred feet from the street frontage of such
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other jurisdictions. This machinery is designed to prevent extemporaneous or ill-considered changes in the zoning ordinance; an extraordinary majority of the governing body must act to amend or change
44
the zoning ordinance under such circumstances.
Boards of Adjustment
The board of adjustment, or board of appeals as it is frequently
called, is an indispensable element in properly functioning zoning
machinery. It is the function of this board to give the requisite
flexibility to the zoning ordinance by granting exceptions, or variances as they are more commonly called, to such ordinances. 45 Resort
to city ordinance for each proposed variance would be unsatisfactory;
delegating power to a single official, such as a building inspector, to
grant variances would be unwise. 46 By establishing a board of adjustment " a municipality furnishes a forum where an applicant can
be heard who thinks he should be allowed some amelioration of the
strict letter of the law."4 7 The board of adjustment is an administrative agency 4s and as such is subject to the general restrictions of administrative law that apply to such discretionary activities - proper
jurisdiction, adequate notice, and full and fair hearing.
A Florida municipality may, at its option, establish a five-man
board of adjustment, 49 but it is not mandatory that such a board
opposite lots, such amendments shall not become effective except b ti -e a
e
vote of three-fourths of the governing body of said munidpality."
This requirement has been held valid in other jurisdictions; it has never
been directly questioned in Florida. 40th St. & Park Ave., Inc. v. Walker, 133
Misc. 907, 234 N.Y. Supp. 708 (Sup. Ct. 1929); Russell v. Murphy, 177 Okla. 255,
58 P.2d 560 (1936); Holzbauer v. Ritter, 184 Wis. 35, 198 N.W. 852 (1924).
4

4See note 43 supra.
45Generally speaking, proceedings before boards of adjustment relate "to permits, certificates of approval, certificates of occupancy, special uses, variances, exceptions, marginal adjustments, nonconforming uses, changes from one nonconforming use to another, repair and restoration of nonconforming structures, extension of nonconforming uses, and the like." 8 MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §25.254 (3d ed., Smith, 1950).
46In many jurisdictions a grant of discretionary power to a building inspector
or similar municipal official would be unconstitutional.
47
BAssrr, ZONING 121 (1940).
4"The term is used here in its administrative law sense. An administrative agency
is one which exercises quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers over persons
and property.
49FLA. STAT. §§176.07-176.09 (1951).
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be created.5o The general enabling act confers upon the board the
power to hear and decide appeals when administrative error is alleged, to grant special exceptions, and to authorize variances when
they will not be contrary to the public interest and when literal enforcement of the zoning ordinance will result in "unnecessary hardship." 5' Appeals may be taken to the board of adjustment by any
aggrieved person or by any municipal officer or department of the
governing body affected by a zoning decision of the administrative
officer.
The purpose of creating boards of adjustment, of course, is to
provide an opportunity for resolving difficult situations without resort to the courts. Not the least of the elements favoring the board
of adjustment procedure is the fact that the administrative remedy
may be sought with little cost to those who feel themselves unreasonably affected by zoning regulations.
No two requests made to a board of adjustment are identical. The
boards are not, therefore, bound to follow precisely an established
system of precedents. Even though a noticeable similarity may be
present in two given instances, that fact alone does not justify basing
a decision on a prior decision. Although such an issue has not been
presented to the Florida Supreme Court, courts in other jurisdictions
have upheld the actions of boards when two apparently similar cases
were decided differently. On occasion the premises have been viewed
by the board itself; distinctions may be based on knowledge which
the courts could not easily acquire.52
soIn State ex rel. Henry v. Miami, 117 Fla. 594, 158 So. 82 (1924), a city
ordinance prohibiting construction of hospital buildings in a residential district
was held not invalid for failure to provide for a board of appeals as authorized
by statute; the language of the act was held permissive rather than mandatory.
The language of Fla. Spec. Acts 1929, c. 14234, §3, was substantially similar to
that of the general enabling act of 1939 allowing a city at its option to create a
board of adjustment or appeal.
5,FLA. STAT. §176.14. The meetings and records of the board must be open to
the public, id. §176.10.
Where zoning boards of adjustment do not exist the city council may resort
to an unsound practice known as "spot zoning." Instead of a variance granted by
an administrative body-with no alteration in the basic zoning plan-the city
council rezones the particular area. The net result in the long run is the abandonment of any long range plan; such action sounds the death knell of comprehensive zoning. It may be added that city councils may spot zone even where
zoning boards of adjustment do exist, and in Florida many city councils have
done exactly that.
s2Fandel v. Board of Zoning Adjustment, 280 Mass. 195, 182 N.E. 343 (1932);
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Florida boards of adjustment, when authorizing a variance from
a zoning ordinance, must conform to the basic rule of "unnecessary
hardship" as stated in the general enabling act, for boards of adjustment must conform to the standards set out in the act delegating
power to them. A variance granted for a lesser reason or simply
because the board might feel that its action would constitute "justice"
would be an invalid application of board authority. As a rule to
guide conduct, this standard has been adopted generally throughout
the country. 3 With the exceptions of the states of Illinois- 4 and
Maryland, 55 the rule has been considered adequate for the most part in
all states where litigation has taken place on the point.
The Florida Supreme Court has held that the unnecessary hardship doctrine is adequate as a standard for the guidance of the discretionary exercise of authority by boards of adjustment. 56 It may
be said that the Florida Supreme Court has required, in effect, that
boards of adjustment must act in accordance with the binding force
of the rule and must not grant variances for lesser reasons than those
of "unnecessary hardship" or "practical difficulty."2
Judicial Review of Board of Adjustment Actions
A particularly knotty problem in zoning, as well as in administrative law generally, is that of judicial review of board of adjustment
actions. The Florida enabling act provides that any person aggrieved
by a decision of a board of adjustment may present a verified petition
to a court of record within thirty days after the filing of the decision
by the board. 8 The requirement of prompt application is undoubtedFalkentau & Hamershlag, Inc. v. Walsh, 214 App. Div. 705, 209 N.Y. Supp. 900
(1st Dep't), afJ'd, 240 N.Y. 688, 148 N.E. 759 (1925); BASSErr, ZONING 127 (1940).
53BAss-r, ZONING 142 (1940).
54Kirby v. Rockford, 363 Ill. 531, 2 N.E.2d 842 (1936); Reschke v. Winnetka,
363 I1. 478, 2 N.E.2d 718 (1936). But cf. Welton v. Hamilton, 344 Ill. 82, 176

N.E. 333 (1931).
55Sugar v. North Baltimore Meth. Prot. Church, 164 Md. 487, 165 Atl. 703

(1933).
56Tau Alpha Holding Corp. v. Board of Adjustments, 126 Fla. 858, 171 So.

819 (1937).
5
7For an instructive, dear, and concise opinion dealing with the meaning of
"practical difficulty and unnecessary hardship" see that of Mr. Justice Cardozo
in Fordham M. R. Church v. Walsh, 244 N.Y. 280, 155 N.E. 575 (1927). This opinion
has been widely quoted as authority.
58FL4. STAT. §176.16 (1951).
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ly premised on the idea that the court may grant a restraining order
that will prevent the beginning of construction, with the accompanying
costs.
Under the act, standing to challenge the decision of a board of
adjustment is accorded to a person or persons "aggrieved" thereby,
or by "any taxpayer," or by municipal officers or boards. While the
Florida Supreme Court has not, apparently, passed directly on the
question of standing to challenge, it has been evident that the
"substantial property right" concept has been a part of the Court's
thinking on the subject. Thus in Miami v. Rosen the Court stated
that "resort to the courts is justified only when substantial property
rights have been illegally or arbitrarily invaded and municipal relief
from unlawful injury has been denied."-5 9 Again in Forde v. Miami
Beach the substantial property right showing as a basis for maintaining
a challenge in the courts was apparent. 60
Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
A touchy phase of the problem of procedure relates to exhaustion
of administrative remedies before resort to the courts. The general
rule of administrative law, of course, is to the effect that judicial
review will not be available until all administrative remedies have
been exhausted. The rule is applied with particular strictness on the
federal level.6 ' The Florida high tribunal has been wrestling for
the past few years with the problem as specifically applied to zoning.
In the Rosen case, in 1942, the Court had reasoned that judicial
review is "justified only when... municipal relief from unlawful injury has been denied." 62 Certainly there was here an implication, albeit a tenuous one, that administrative remedies, or, to use the Court's
words, "municipal relief," must first be exhausted or "denied." In other
words, there might have been at this date ground for the belief that,
when a municipality elected to create a board of adjustment under the
Florida general enabling act, action before the board must be completed before resort to the courts could be had.
59151 Fla. 677, 686, 10 So.2d 307, 310 (1942).

6
OSee note 35 supra. A purchaser of property who effects the transaction with
knowledge of the applicability of zoning regulations is not precluded from
challenging the validity of the ordinance. Miami Beach v. Ocean & Inland Co.,
146 Fla. 145, 2O0 So. 402 (1941).
GlMyers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 304 U.S. 41 (1938), is one of the
basic cases illustrating this established federal principle.
62Miami v. Rosen, 151 Fla. 677, 686, 10 So.2d 307, 310 (1942).
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The Florida Supreme Court apparently followed the dicta of the
Rosen case in De Carlo v. West Miami.63 Frances De Carlo sued to
enjoin the town from enforcing a zoning ordinance as applied to her
property. Upon the circuit court's dismissal of her action she appealed.
The Supreme Court held the suit premature, since it had been filed
before the plaintiff's administrative remedies had been exhausted.
The point has been raised in three later cases. In Miami Beach
v. Perell14 an action was brought to prevent the city from enforcing
a zoning ordinance. The circuit court held for Perell and the city
appealed. The Florida Supreme Court held that the evidence supported the findings of fact and that the provisions of the ordinance
prohibiting operation of auction sales establishments except in certain
zones were unreasonable, arbitrary, and void. The city argued that
Perell had not exhausted his administrative remedies. The Court,
however, distinguished the De Carlo case and ruled that Perell's attack was a general one. He had attacked the entire ordinance rather
than limiting himself to the narrow issue of how the ordinance affected his own property; therefore, the Court said, there was no
need to exhaust administrative remedies.
In Miami Shores v. Bessemer Properties65 the company sought
a mandatory injunction to compel the village to change the zoning
of the company's property from residential to business. The circuit
court rendered judgment for the company and the village appealed.
The complainant challenged the zoning restrictions in the circuit
court on equitable grounds, and the defendant village accepted the
challenge in its answer but failed to raise the point that administrative
remedies should have been exhausted. The trial court, taking cognizance of this aspect of the case, tried and disposed of the cause
on its merits. The Florida Supreme Court held that under these
circumstances it also would adjudicate the entire case on its merits
alone. The village had lost the right to plead the defense of exhaustion of administrative remedies. There is a clear inference in the
Court's opinion that it will accept the contention that administrative
0349 So.2d 596 (Fla. 1951). Two judges dissented, at p. 597, arguing that any
doubt as to the existence of municipal power should be resolved against the city.
Further, the dissenters argued that the exhaustion doctrine should not be interposed or construed as granting to a municipality the power to adjudicate the
constitutionality of its own ordinances.
6452 So.2d 906 (Fla. 1951).
6554 So.2d 108 (Fla. 1951).
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remedies have not been exhausted if that contention be timely raised.
On the merits the Court found that the zoning of the property in
question bore no true relationship to proper zoning classification.
To the same effect is the decision of Surfside v. Normandy Beach
Development Co.,66 wherein the Court again ruled that failure of
the town to raise the point of exhaustion of administrative remedies
before appeal constituted a waiver of that defense. The Court re67
fused to hear that issue for the first time on appeal.
It apparently is clear that a city, in defending against an attack
on a zoning ordinance, must present at the outset any argument based
on the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. Further,
the attacker of such an ordinance may still be able to avoid the effect
of the doctrine by attacking the ordinance generally rather than by
limiting the attack to the effect of the ordinance on the complainant's
property.
AESTHETIrCs

Florida municipalities quite naturally have a genuine economic
interest in maintaining a high level of civic development. For that
reason the question of taking aesthetics into account in zoning is
one that has plagued Florida city councils in recent years and will
arise with increasing frequency in the future. The problem is not,
of course, peculiar to Florida, but the impact on Florida cities is
especially great because of the desirability of their attractiveness from
a tourist standpoint.
All members of the bar are familiar with the general rule that
aesthetic objectives in and of themselves cannot justify an exercise
of the power to zone. 68 As the rule has been applied in other jurisdictions, a municipal ordinance cannot restrict floor area on the
sole basis of aesthetic considerations;6 9 aesthetic reasons have not been
6657 So.2d 844 (Fla. 1952).
67
0n the facts the Court held that when unplatted property was bounded by
a street, a six-story hotel, vacant property zoned for apartments and hotels, and
property on which was built a two-story apartment house, and the property had
little value as a residential property but a business value of $20,000, a zoning
restriction limiting use to one and two-family residential structures was arbitrary
and unreasonable.
68St. Louis v. Dreisoerner, 243 Mo. 217, 147 S.V. 998 (1912). 8 McQUILLIN.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §§25.29-25.31 (3d ed., Smith, 1950) discusses the general
questions of zoning and aesthetics.
69 Baker v. Somerville, 138 Neb. 466, 293 N.V. 326 (1940).
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sufficient to sustain a prohibition of removal of topsoil near a
highly restricted residential district;70 and aesthetic taste will not sustain control of private property under the guise of the police power.7 I
A classic statement of this point of view is found in the New Jersey
72
case of Pfister v. Municipal Council of Clifton, wherein it was said:
"Aesthetic considerations are a matter of luxury and indulgence rather than of necessity, and it is necessity alone which
justifies the exercise of the police power to take private property without compensation."
This attitude toward aesthetic matters is founded upon the old
common law doctrine that "the law does not give an action for
matters of delight." It is true, moreover, that aesthetic considerations
depend upon a wide variety of tastes and cultures; therefore, reasonable definition in the law is most difficult, if not impossible. 73 Background and practical considerations have contributed to the general
rule that aesthetic objects alone are not sufficient to justify an exercise of the zoning power which restricts property rights.
Yet the courts have not been unaware of the subject of aesthetics.
True, an action based on aesthetics alone would not be favorably received, but aesthetic objectives have been taken into consideration
by the courts along with other relevant and proper objectives
for the exercise of zoning power.74 Courts generally have been willing
to say that their decisions cannot be controlled by aesthetic considerations but that such objects may be considered in determining the
reasonableness of zoning legislation.7" Nor can the objection be raised
that a zoning ordinance promotes aesthetic ends, if the legislation can
7oTown of Harrison v. Sunny Ridge Builders, 170 Misc. 161, 8 N.Y.S.2d 521

(Sup. Ct. 1938).
71MacCrae v. Fayetteville, 198 N.C. 51, 150 S.E. 810 (1929).
-133 N.J.L. 148, 152, 43 A.2d 275, 278 (1945).
73State Bank 8: Trust Co. v. Wilmette, 358 Ill. 311, 193 N.E. 131 (1934);
Youngstown v. Kahn Bldg. Co., 112 Ohio St. 654, 148 N.E. 842 (1925).
74St. Louis Poster Advertising Co. v. St. Louis, 249 U.S. 269 (1919); York Harbor
Village Corp. v. Libby, 126 Me. 537, 140 Atl. 382 (1928); Opinion of the Justices,
234 Mass. 597, 127 N.E. 525 (1920); Frischkorn Constr. Co. v. Redford Twp. Bldg.
Insp., 315 Mich. 556, 24 N.W.2d 209 (1946); Senefsky v. Huntington Woods, 307
Mich. 728, 12 N.W.2d 387 (1934), 43 MIcn. L. REv. 228 (1944); Sundeen v. Rogers,
83 N.H. 253, 141 At. 142 (1928).
7"Murphy, Inc. v. Westport, 131 Conn. 292, 40 A.2d 177 (1944); In re Appeal
of Parker, 214 N.C. 51, 197 S.E. 706 (1938).
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be sustained on other valid grounds. The fact that a city council
considered the aesthetic value of the ordinance at the time it was
passed, along with other valid grounds sufficient to sustain the ordinance, is no basis for invalidation of the restriction.-6
7
The general judicial attitude is stated in Opinion of the Justices: 7
"Enhancement of the artistic attractiveness of the city or town
can be considered in exercising the power conferred by the
proposed act only when the dominant aim in respect to the
establishment of districts based on use and construction of
buildings has primary regard to other factors lawfully within
the scope of the police power; and then it can be considered,
not as the main purpose to be attained, but only as subservient
to another or other main ends recognized as sufficient ... "
Yet many members of the legal profession, and even a few courts,
have been unwilling to accept completely this interpretation. As far
back as 1922 Henry P. Chandler could detect what he took to be
evidences that judicial attitude on the subject might be changing.78
79
In 1923 Judge Owen of the Wisconsin Supreme Court stated:
"It seems to us that aesthetic considerations are relative in
their nature. With the passing of time, social standards conform to new ideals. As a race, our sensibilities are becoming
more refined, and that which formerly did not offend cannot
now be endured. That which the common law did not condemn
as a nuisance is now frequently outlawed by the written law.
76Sundeen v. Rogers, 83 N.H. 253, 141 Ad. 142 (1928).
77234 Mass. 597, 605, 127 N.E. 525, 529 (1920), followed in Burlington v. Dunn,
318 Mass. 216, 61 N.E.2d 243 (1945). In Dowsey v. Kensington, 231 App. Div. 746,
257 N.Y. 221, 230 (2d Dep't 1931), the court stated: "Aesthetic considerations are,
fortunately, not wholly without weight in a practical world. Perhaps such considerations need not be disregarded in the formulation of regulations to promote
the public welfare. . . . 'Public welfare' is a concept which in recent years has
been widened to include many matters which in other times were regarded as
outside the limits of governmental concern. As yet, at least, no judicial definition
has been formulated which is wide enough to include purely aesthetic considerations."
8Attitude of the Law toward Beauty, 8 A.B.A.J. 470. For another early state-

ment on aesthetics as a possible consideration in zoning see BAsnt,
OF ZONING, c. 1 (1927).
79State v. Harper, 182 Wis. 148, 196 NAV. 451, 455 (1923).
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This is not because the subject outlawed is of a different nature,
but because our sensibilities have become more refined and
our ideals more exacting. Nauseous smells have always come
under the ban of the law, but ugly sights and discordant surroundings may be just as distressing to keener sensibilities. The
rights of property should not be sacrificed to the pleasure of an
ultra-aesthetic taste. But whether they should be permitted to
plague the average or dominant human sensibilities well may
be pondered."
Persons of the calibre of Paul Sayre of the Iowa Law School have
argued cogently that the judiciary should recognize frankly that
aesthetics bear a fundamental relationship to property values and
that recognition of this relationship should change the usual judicial
attitude toward zoning and aesthetics. It is Professor Sayre's belief
that the courts are slowly but inevitably working toward this position.8 0
The power to control the erection and construction of billboards
has been established for many years.-' Though many of the cases
were decided on grounds of public safety, others have at least given
weight to matters of aesthetics and property values.12 In what was
obviously a decision based solely upon the desire to preserve the
historical character of the New Orleans French Quarter, the Louisiana
Supreme Court held that the City of New Orleans had the power to
create the Vieux Carre Commission for the purpose of preserving the
antique character of the French and Spanish quarters in New Orleans
and that proprietors of buildings in the Vieux Carre must first obtain
from the Commission permission to maintain or display advertising
signs. The ordinance specified the maximum dimensions of such
signs 13
The assertion may safely be made that the courts have been willing
SoAesthetics and Property Values, 35 A.B.A.J. 471 (1949). Among cases he cites
In support of his thesis are Neef v. Springfield, 380 Ill. 275, 43 N.E.2d 947 (1942);
Burlington v. Dunn, supra note 77; Baddour v. Long Beach, 297 N.Y. 167, 18
N.E.2d 18 (1938).
BlOne of the earlier cases is St. Louis Poster Advertising Co. v. St. Louis, 249 U.S.
269 (1919).
82
1n the well-known case of General Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Department
of Public Works, 289 Mass. 149, 193 N.E. 799 (1935), zoning legislation regulating
billboards was held valid, the court reasoning that the presence of the billboards
might impair the scenic qualities of the area as well as depreciate the value of
surrounding property.
83New Orleans v. Perament, 198 La. 852, 5 So.2d 129 (1941).
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to go further along the road toward recognition of aesthetics in the
billboard field than in other areas. Perhaps this tendency has been
aided by the undoubted safety factors involved, particularly in the
regulation of billboards along scenic highways where those billboards
might distract the attention of the motorist. That scenic factors happen to be coincidental is fortunate. It may also be noted that billboards are actually a phase of business operations; business itself may
be zoned and signs can easily be prohibited under a similar rationalization. Decisions of the courts, however, have fairly well placed the
billboard in a category by itself so far as regulation is concerned.8
Of greater importance to Florida cities, perhaps, are the questions
involved in what is known as "architectural zoning." This term is
used to denote compulsion by the municipality to secure a similarity
or synonymity of structures. The practice of restricting construction
in residential areas through the use of private covenants is a common
mechanism. Through such covenants, control of styles of architecture,
bulk and footage of buildings, and other aims may be accomplished. 5
What, however, of government action to effect the same ends?
St. Augustine and Coral Gables, Florida, and Monterey, California,
have all imposed some degree of architectural control in particular
sections. In none of the three instances have the ordinances been
subjected to court test on the aesthetic issue. Certainly in the cases
of St. Augustine and Monterey, the action might be sustained on the
ground of the historic importance of the areas involved. 86
Yet it is safe to say that architectural control regulations would
find hard sledding indeed with the courts in Florida today. A 1947
ordinance of the City of West Palm Beach requiring that each new
building equal substantially the building next to it in design, appearance, height, and floor footage was invalidated as leaving too
8
much discretion to the agency charged with its administration. 7 If
84Sorenson,

Architectural Control of Buildings,

MUNIcPALrriES

AND

THE LAW

ACTION, Proceedings of the Nat. Inst. of Municipal Law Officers 357 (1949).
SsBarton v. Moline Properties, 121 Fla. 683, 164 So. 551 (1935). But cf. Osius v.
Barton, 109 Fla. 556, 147 So. 862 (1933).
86Fla. Spec. Acts 1937, c. 18873; Sorenson, supra note 84, at 358; St. Augustine
Record, July 4, 1937.
87West Palm Beach v. State ex rel. Duffey, 158 Fla. 863, 30 So.2d 491 (1947).
Minimum footage, bulk, and height requirements have been declared unconstitutional in New Jersey, Brookdale Homes, Inc. v. Johnson, 126 N.J.L. 516, 19
A.2d 868 (1941); and footage requirements have been declared invalid in Michigan, Frischkorn Constr. Co. v. Lambert, supra note 74; Senefsky v. Huntington
IN
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such a municipal action would not be sustained by the courts, how
may it be argued that more stringent regulations looking to general
architectural control would be declared constitutional?
This is not to say that the Florida Supreme Court has not been
aware of matters aesthetic. Indeed, in many respects the Court has
made a considerable contribution to judicial literature dealing with
the problem. In Miami Beach v. Ocean and Inland Co.s8 a zoning
ordinance restricted the use of the area two blocks deep along the
seashore to hotels and apartment hotels. Commercial enterprises
were permitted to operate along streets extending at right angles to
the beach, except where such streets crossed a restricted area. The
Court held that, in view of the character of Miami Beach as a vacation
resort, the ordinance was not so unreasonable and arbitrary when
applied to property situated on an intersecting street just within the
restricted area as to constitute deprivation of property without due
process of law. 9 "It is difficult," said the Court, "to see how the success
of Miami Beach could continue if its aesthetic appeal were ignored
because the beauty of the community is a distinct lure to the winter
traveler."Do
Certainly the influence of aesthetics was present in the thinking
of the Florida Court in the Ocean and Inland case. The Court was
greatly and obviously influenced by the fact that Miami Beach is fundamentally a tourist city. Loath as the judges might be to predicate an
opinion entirely on the basis of aesthetic considerations, the decision
in the Ocean and Inland case comes very dose to that rationale. 9'
Woods, supra note 74; and in Nebraska, Baker v. Somerville, supra note 69.
Aesthetics were only incidentally a consideration in a Lake Worth ordinance
providing minimum lot size and street width before approval could be gained for
plats for real estate subdivisions within city limits. The ordinance was held valid
in Garvin v. Baker, 59 So.2d 360 (Fla. 1952).
88147 Fla. 480, 3 So.2d 364 (1941). This is the second of two cases with the
same name.
SThe Florida Court has followed the rule that in a zoning ordinance the line
must of necessity be drawn somewhere, else the zoning ordinance ceases to have
substance and meaning.
00147 Fla. 480, 487, 3 So.2d 364, 367 (1941). The Court noted with approval
the statement of Judge Owen of the Wisconsin Supreme Court.
-iThough aesthetics were not directly at issue in Stengel v. Crandon, 156 Fla.
592, 23 So.2d 835 (1945), the Court in referring to the Ocean and Inland decision,
said: " . . we took into consideration aesthetics in connection with general welfare of a community having the characteristics and the appeal of Miami Beach."
Id. at 596, 23 So.2d at 837.
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In the recent case of Miami Beach v. First Trust Co. 92 the Florida
Supreme Court marched up the hill of aesthetics and then down again.
The facts of this case, already discussed, involved the validity of a Miami Beach zoning ordinance of 1930 as it applied to lands of the Firestone Estate in 1949.
In an opinion filed July 5, 1949, the Court, speaking through Mr.
Justice Thomas, held for the City of Miami Beach. After pointing
out that the line must be drawn somewhere, else the Court would
be merely substituting its judgment for that of the city officials and
the zoning ordinance would be dissipated by a "sort of judicial eros9
sion," Justice Thomas said: 3
"We have already recognized, in City of Miami Beach v.
Ocean and Inland Co., . . . the peculiar qualities of the community of Miami Beach as an attraction to visitors. That is
its very raison d'etre. We said there that a case like this, affecting a city like that, does not involve a matter of public
morals or of public safety or of public health. The question
of general welfare obtains, and the general welfare of the city,
considered in this light, is just as manifest today as it was
* . . when this fabulous city was only a small town of 6,000
inhabitants.
"Summarizing, we believe, as we did when we adopted the
opinion in City of Miami Beach v. Ocean and Inland Company,
. . that the peculiar characteristics and qualities of the City
of Miami Beach justify zoning to perpetuate its aesthetic appeal, and that this is an exercise of the police power in the
protection of public welfare." 94
-

Mr. Chief Justice Adams and Justices Terrell, Sebring, and Hobson
concurred, with Justices Chapman and Barnes dissenting.
Had events stopped at this point the case would have been a
significant one for those interested in promulgating the doctrine of
aesthetics. The Court had tied aesthetics to the general welfare in
well-nigh unmistakable fashion. It had stated expressly that, in the
circumstances under which the case arose, the public health, safety,
or morals were not involved.
9245 So.2d 681 (Fla. 1950). Discussion of this major case as it was concerned
with the doctrine of presumptive validity is found at pp. 365, 366 supra.
9345 So.2d 681, 684 (Fla. 1950).

94Italics added. After making these statements the Court then proceeded to
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But the July, 1949, opinion was not to be allowed to stand. Upon
rehearing the Court found for the trust company and against the city.05
The shift was accomplished through a change in attitude of Justices
Terrell and Hobson. Justice Terrell now ruled that a positive showing
of physical, economic, or social change rather than aesthetic considerations or group caprice is necessary to justify a release from
zoning regulations. The 1930 zoning restrictions preventing the use
of the particular area for hotels and apartment houses should be removed because of changed conditions. The city's population had
increased and the property would be worth over four times as much
with the restrictions removed. The zoning plan of the city would
not be jeopardized or any property owners hurt. The action of the
city amounted to outright confiscation.
Thus history in the field of zoning regulations was not written.
Nevertheless the opinion of Justice Thomas, dissent though it eventually turned out to be, is now spread on the reports and, taken with
the Ocean and Inland case, may serve as precedent in the future. The
inference must perforce be a cautious one in view of the strong tone
of Justice Terrell's opinion on rehearing.96
Certainly protection against haphazard or sudden change is a
basic part of any zoning plan.9 7 But the plan should also be susceptible
to change in the light of conditions not adequately recognized or
impossible to foresee when the zoning ordinance was passed.98 It is
invoke the presumption doctrine.
0545 So.2d 681, 687 (Fla. 1950).
PThere is an interesting postscript to the Firestone case. After the Court had
ruled for the estate on rehearing the city acted to prevent the building of hotels
on adjacent properties by instituting condemnation proceedings on two choice
lots with a view to making them a public park. After the action was begun the
owners of the lots, relying on the Firestone case, sought to get their holdings rezoned for hotel purposes, not because they wished to build hotels but because
the city would be forced to pay the increased value. The Florida Supreme Court,
however, upheld the Miami Beach zoning ordinance and the right of the city to
condemn and acquire the land for park purposes. Miami Beach v. Hogan, 63
So.2d 493 (Fla. 1953); Miami Beach v. Elsalto Real Estate, Inc., 63 So.2d 495 (Fla.

1953).
9

7Mercer Lumber Cos. v. Glencoe, 390 Il. 138, 60 N.E.2d 913 (1945).
VsForde v. Miami Beach, 146 Fla. 676, 1 So.2d 642 (1941). Zoning regulations
are subject to removal or change when the reason for them ceases to exist, Siegel
v. Adams, 44 So.2d 427 (Fla. 1950).
One of the most interesting developments indicative of our "motor car society"
has been the tendency to add to zoning ordinances requirements that places of
assembly provide space for off-street parking as a condition precedent to con-
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fair to ask whether the subject of aesthetics may not be one of the
changing conditions which, at some unpredictable date, Florida courts
and courts generally will finally recognize.

Such is the current status of some of the important legal problems
of Florida municipal zoning. The state was the last in the Union to
adopt a general enabling act for comprehensive zoning, though the
lack of such action was, in part, overcome by special acts authorizing
particular municipalities to zone comprehensively. There can be
no argument today that adequate zoning legislation is absolutely
vital to the well-being of Florida cities.
It is readily apparent that the Florida Supreme Court has been
cautious as it has sought to develop doctrines capable of rationalizing the necessity for private right to yield to the exercise of police
power as expressed in zoning ordinances. Older doctrines and philosophies have been gradually modified to adapt them to changing economic and social conditions. The Court has been very much aware
that the balance between private right and public necessity must be
accomplished gradually.
The Court is feeling its way. Though it has not yet accepted aesthetics as a sole basis for zoning legislation, it has recognized that
aesthetics may properly be considered when the zoning ordinance
has a basis in other valid objectives of this exercise of the police
power. The Court has shifted its attitude in applying the doctrine
of presumptive validity; the attacker of a zoning ordinance today
carries the burden of proof, a burden which early twentieth-century
attackers of such ordinances did not have to shoulder. The Court has
shown signs that it may one day accept the concept that administrative
remedies must be exhausted before resort can be had to court review
of actions of boards of zoning appeals.
Zoning problems, and the broader problems of city planning, will
become even more important in the years to come. The Florida bench
and bar can be certain that when the problems raised in this article
have been settled others will rise to take their places.
struction. The issue has not yet been squarely met in Florida. However, in State
ex rel. Tampa Co. of Jehovah's Witnesses v. Tampa, 48 So.2d 78, 79 (Fla. 1950),
Justice Terrell indicated in a dictum that such a regulation as applied to places
of worship has no relationship to public health, morals, safety, or welfare and
that denying a permit to such a group was arbitrary.
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